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Politicisation and economic governance design  
Abstract 
The functional pressures shaping policy design may be disrupted in salient policies and politicised 
contexts, according to recent postfunctionalist/new intergovernmentalist theories. We contrast these 
expectations with those derived from liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism by analysing 
the reforms of the European Union economic governance. Its Council-centred enforcement, which has 
been a dominant feature until the euro crisis, despite noncompliance, does not sit comfortably with 
traditional theories but can be explained by policy salience and implementation uncertainties. Instead, 
the emphasis that traditional approaches assign to noncompliance, commitment problems, threats of 
exclusion and veto, issue linkages, path dependencies and supranational decision-making, allows to 
adequately account for the overall direction of reforms toward more tightening and delegation, 
notwithstanding the pooled enforcement in recent ancillary measures. Postfunctionalist theories overall 
fall short in highly politicised contexts, exactly where they should do most of the explaining. We 
conclude discussing politicization as a strategic elite response. 
 
Introduction 
The rules governing economic and fiscal policies in the European Union (EU) are a centrepiece of the 
economic and monetary union. Over the years, they have become subject to heated public debates. 
Reforms that originally attracted only the interest of the specialized press generate now broad and 
polarised public discussions (Kriesi and Grande 2016: 253). How has such politicisation been managed 
and what are the consequences for the design of these rules? When legislators adopt any EU policy, 
they take three key design decisions. First, they establish common rules. Second, they determine the 
modality and extent to which they are involved in policy-making. Third, they determine the 
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prerogatives and constraints of the authorities in charge of implementation. In this article, we compare 
and contrast expectations of policy design derived from liberal intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism with those arising from a new wave of theorizing, which originates from 
postfunctionalism and falls under the general rubric of new intergovernmentalism. These new theories 
argue that politicisation has consequences for policy design that are unaccounted for by traditional 
approaches. We subject these claims to test by focusing on a policy that is prone to politicisation and 
by taking advantage of the fact that its most recent reform was significantly more politicised than 
previous ones. 
Studies of economic governance take mainly one theoretical perspective, such as liberal 
intergovernmentalism (Biermann et al. 2019; Schimmelfennig 2015), neofunctionalism and its variants 
(Niemann and Ioannou 2015; Verdun 2015) or postfunctionalist-based approaches (e.g. Börzel and 
Risse 2018; Fabbrini 2016; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018; Puetter 2012). We follow Heipertz and 
Verdun (2005; 2010) and Schimmelfennig (2014) and consider all the most relevant theories of policy 
design. Additionally, most works concentrate solely on the most recent reform. We instead analyse 
economic governance since its inception, building on the extant analyses of the 1997 and 2005 reforms 
(Heipertz and Verdun 2005; 2010; Schure and Verdun 2008; Segers and van Esch 2007).  
But unlike these studies, we subject expectations to empirical corroboration through a systematic 
analysis of the bargaining dynamics and the provision-specific patterns of governance design adopted 
between 1993 and 2013. We conceive the design of a policy as characterized by a set of provisions 
with specific and, occasionally, multiple properties. Tightening provisions impose requirements and 
obligations on national authorities, whereas loosening ones relax such demands or offer them leeway. 
For instance, the deficit and debt reference values in the treaty protocol on excessive deficit procedure 
tightened control over national fiscal policies, while the adoption in 2005 of country-specific (rather 
than common) medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs), which can diverge from a balance position, 
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loosened control. Pooling provisions are those where the Council takes decisions by voting procedures 
other than unanimity and delegating ones are those where policy prerogatives are conferred upon the 
European Commission. Both pooling and delegation can be subject to constraints. For instance, the 
decision to establish the existence of an excessive deficit is pooled within the Council, but until 2005 
exceptional circumstances could be granted only in case of an annual fall of real gross domestic 
product (GDP) of at least 2 percent. Since 2005, the Commission can amend poor quality data on 
public finances, subject to prompt communication to the relevant member state and the Economic and 
Financial Committee.  
Do established theories help explain the patterns we observe? Or do they need to be qualified, given the 
salience and politicisation of the policy? In the conclusion we will engage with the concept of 
politicization as strategic response but, for the most part the manuscript, politicisation is conceptualized 
as an expansion of the scope of conflict within national political systems which translates into bottom-
up pressures on EU-level actors (Bressanelli et al. forthcoming; Schimmelfennig forthcoming). We 
leverage the documented observation that the recent reform was characterized by significantly more 
extensive and polarised involvement of public actors - two key politicisation dimensions - than earlier 
ones (Kriesi and Grande 2016), making such reform a most-likely case for politicisation to shape policy 
design. How have EU-level actors reacted in response to such pressures? We begin our investigation by 
introducing the theoretical predictions. 
Integration Theories, Politicisation and Policy Design 
We limit our attention to integration theories, or variants therein, that offer clear expectations about 
policy design. Length constraints prevent us from discussing the full richness of these approaches. 
These expectations focus on tightening, loosening, pooling and delegation. 
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For liberal intergovernmentalism, pooling and delegation are driven by the need to bolster credibility of 
policy commitments, when incomplete contracting and incentives to renege on agreements create 
problems of time consistency (Moravcsik 1998: 73-77). Pooling and delegation occur when future 
decisions are uncertain, joint gains are high and distributional conflicts are moderate. Pooling entails 
less loss of governmental control than delegation. It is preferred when policies require additional 
measures because it undermines unilateral vetoes to secondary legislation. In addition to reducing 
legislative workload, delegation addresses concerns about domestic compliance and it is more likely in 
enforcement since a supranational bureaucracy pursues this activity more credibly than a Council of 
elected ministers does. A higher risk of noncompliance should therefore tilt policy design toward 
delegation (i.e. Commission empowerment) and plausibly tightening. 
Opposition is likely to be voiced by governments that expect being either in a minority position or 
noncompliant. The preferences of governments with superior bargaining power, resulting from 
asymmetric interdependence, eventually shape outcomes. Most influential are those that a) place 
relatively higher value to the best alternative to an agreement and that b) can form viable alternative 
coalitions that are costly to the excluded countries. The first situation underlies credible threats to veto, 
the second credible threats to exclude. Issue linkages may play a role as well, but within issue areas, if 
interests are asymmetrically distributed, benefits concentrated and costs diffused (Moravcsik 1998: 60-
67). 
Neofunctionalism encompasses more variegated contributions but a common thread is the emphasis on 
endogeneity, as well as uncertainty, in policy design (e.g. Heipertz and Verdun 2010: 64-67; 
Schimmelfennig 2014: 326-327). According to its institutionalist variant, past decisions have profound 
consequences for current bargaining because of endogenous interdependencies, spillovers and path 
dependencies (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Pierson 1996). Consider an obvious example: a flexible 
exchange rate is costlier now for Eurozone countries compared to when they were members of the 
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European monetary system. The uncertainty and exit cost associated with leaving a monetary union are 
significant, effectively precluding this option. 
Except for the need of centralized expertise which may justify delegation, neofunctionalism does not 
suggest new logics of policy design (Schimmelfennig 2014: 334). One of its key insights is that a more 
supranational policy process may lead to different outcomes (i.e. a ‘cultivated’ spillover effect). The 
agent/agenda setter’s position, institutional hurdles (lower voting thresholds), inter-institutional 
conflicts may all shape the final design. For instance, demands for tightening and delegation are more 
likely to be met under qualified majority voting since recalcitrant governments, preferring ample 
national discretion and narrowly defined Commission’s competences, can be overruled. The outcome 
may tilt further in this direction under the ordinary legislative procedure if the position of European 
Parliament is closer to that of the supranational executive than to that of the Council (Franchino 2007: 
64-5, 285-6). 
There is however reason to believe that these traditional rationales may not be at play. According to 
Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2018: 181-182), fiscal policy is a core state power where bargaining is 
zero-sum. Compliance falls predominantly on governmental rather than societal actors; it faces tighter 
capacity constraints and may require the building up of capacity at the EU level. Negotiations are 
therefore highly politicised. Moreover, the bargaining context has changed. In a study of six European 
countries, Kriesi and Grande (2016: 253) report that the latest economic governance reform has been 
‘the integration debate with the highest public visibility’ in the mass media since the early 1970s. Its 
politicisation, including the involvement and polarisation of actors, was on a par with the debate on the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In sum, economic governance is more politicised than other 
policies and its politicisation has increased over time. 
Accordingly, Schimmelfenning (2014: 322) argues that the recent euro crisis contains the conditions 
for Hooghe and Marks (2009)’s postfunctionalism to offer better guidance. For these scholars, in an 
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age of politicisation and public dissensus on European integration, outcomes may not reflect functional 
pressures any longer and identity-based contestation may make all the difference. If European issues 
are politicised on identity lines, we should see a ‘downward pressure on the level and scope of 
integration’ and a narrowing of the ‘substantive ground of possible agreement’ (Hooghe and Marks 
2009: 21-2). For our purposes, this could be interpreted as loosening, less pooling and delegation, but 
Hooghe and Marks (2009: 21, 22) are more ambivalent. They tentatively conclude that politicisation 
may lead to both less integration (loosening) and more delegation – the latter presumably seen as a 
means to depoliticise an issue. 
This indeterminacy is resolved in the recent wave of new intergovernmentalist theorizing that shares 
postfunctionalist premises such as the relevance assigned to the post-Maastricht rise in public dissensus 
and politicisation (Bickerton et al. 2015: 709-711; Fabbrini and Puetter 2016: 486). According to this 
variant, the post-Maastricht period is marked by ‘integration without supranationalism’ (Bickerton et 
al. 2015: 703). Initiatives are characterized by greater reliance on the European Council and the 
Council for policy execution and implementation (Fabbrini and Puetter 2016: 481). Delegation of 
powers ‘to traditional supranational institutions such as the Commission [is] increasingly discredited 
among member state governments’ (Puetter 2016: 604), de novo institutions are preferred, and 
unanimous decision-making within intergovernmental institutions acquires greater prominence 
(Fabbrini 2016: 593; Fabbrini and Puetter 2016: 488). This reluctance to pool and delegate is 
particularly relevant in highly salient or core state powers such as fiscal policy. These scholars do not 
seem to associate ‘integration’ with tighter national obligations, but rather with loose coordination 
measures that marginally encroach upon national policy autonomy. This is plausible in light of how 
politicisation operates. Once an issue becomes politicised, public dissensus restricts governments’ 
room to manoeuvre, making them less inclined to relinquish sovereignty and even temped to reining in 
lost control (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 18-22; Puetter 2012: 168). Postfunctionalist scholars do not 
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differentiate the impact of politicisation by country or government, but it could be argued for instance 
that politicisation may have led Germany to demand more delegation and tightening in the last reform, 
and Greece to push for the opposite. But this proposition is undistinguishable from liberal 
intergovernmentalist predictions as it is based on a government’s expectation of being compliant, thus 
making politicisation epiphenomenal. 
In conclusion, if the euro crisis has been an highly politicised identity conflict (Börzel and Risse 2018) 
or represents the ‘apex of the [new] intergovernmental moment’ (Fabbrini 2013: 1010), the functional 
pressures in policy design identified by liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are 
disrupted and concerns about losing control are heightened. Therefore, economic governance should 
rely less on pooling and delegation and plausibly more on loosening, especially in politicised contexts. 
Table 1 summarizes the key expectations. Next, we explain our coding of policy design. 
Table 1: Expectations and driving mechanisms of policy design 
Integration theory Expectations Driving mechanisms 
Liberal 
intergovernmentalism 
Pooling for additional measures, delegation for 
enforcement and implementation. Noncompliance 
leads to more delegation and plausibly tightening  
 
Veto threats, exclusion threats and issue 
linkages shape outcomes 
Neofunctionalism 
(institutionalist variant) 
Delegation also to benefit from centralized expertise  
 
Exit costs, supranational institutions and 
decision-making also shape outcomes 
 
Postfunctionalism / New 
intergovernmentalism 
Less pooling and delegation, and plausibly loosening 
in salient policies and politicised contexts † 
Governments object to pooling and 
delegation and try to loosen obligations 
 
Note: † Loosening and more delegation for Hooghe and Marks (2009). 
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Measuring the design of economic governance measures 
The EU economic governance regime is based on the chapter on economic policy and the protocol on 
the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) of the Treaty on European Union. Secondary measures include 
an EDP regulation, the stability and growth pact (SGP), made of a preventive, a corrective and a recent 
enforcement regulation. There are also ancillary acts harmonizing and monitoring national budgetary 
procedures. Additional measures, which we can only briefly discuss here, are the macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure (MIB) and the fiscal compact treaty (the Online Appendix lists provisions and the 
seventeen acts subject to our study). 
We broadly follow the method of coding provisions developed in the American congressional literature 
and applied by Franchino (2007) to EU legislation. Each legal act, including treaty provisions and 
protocols, is subdivided into major provisions. Each major provision is coded if it imposes obligations 
on member states (tightening) or gives them leeway in implementing measures (loosening). Similarly, 
each major provision is coded if it pools policy authority within the Council (pooling), it delegates 
authority to the Commission (delegation) and it sets constraints upon these institutions. A provision 
can have multiple properties. For instance, it may delegate a policy prerogative, subject to constraints. 
We also determine whether pooled and delegated authority is related to an enforcement activity, such 
as establishing noncompliance or monitoring budgets. Provisions have been coded independently first, 
then disparities have been settled (coding rules are in the Online Appendix). Inter-coder agreement is 
89 percent greater than would be expected by chance. 
This procedure is reliable, easily replicable and produces data that greatly facilitate comparison across 
measures, time, and even policies, but it is not devoid of drawbacks. It treats policy prerogatives 
equally. A provision that confers upon the Commission the power to determine noncompliance has the 
same weight as one that asks this institution to adopt data collection guidelines. Also, a small change to 
an existing constraint, such as the shortening of a time limit, has to be either disregarded or double 
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counted (we opted for the former). These shortcomings are not serious enough to distort the broad 
patterns we observe and, where necessary, we will compensate for this coarseness by distinguishing 
among types of policy prerogatives. On the other hand, we took two coding decisions to make sure that 
some important changes are detected. First, we code as constraint on the Council if this institution has 
to cooperate or co-decide with the Parliament, while disregarding simple consultation. Second, 
delegation is the granting of substantive policy authority to shape outcomes (Franchino 2007: 84). It 
excludes the sole examination of documents and the proposal prerogatives of the Commission, unless 
they are enhanced, that is, if less than a Council qualified majority is sufficient to adopt proposals. 
Here, the Commission has a significant chance of affecting outcomes. 
Figure 1 displays the number of provisions in force after important reforms (see Online Appendix for 
detailed breakdowns). Major and tightening provisions have quintupled since the completion of the 
initial framework in 1997. Initially no provisions loosened control or conferred some policy leeway to 
member states, but since 2005 the number has moderately increased. Pooling provisions have remained 
constant until 2005, and then they almost tripled. The associated constraints tripled both with the initial 
SGP and with the latest reforms. Instead, apart from standard proposal prerogatives, no provisions 
delegated powers to the Commission until the 2005 reform of the EDP. The total tally is now almost 
ten times larger and the associated constraints have sextupled since. 
The following analysis of negotiations is also based on information on contested issues and positions of 
institutional and governmental actors. The methodology for collecting these data, including a detailed 
account of the sources and strategies of identification and cross-validation, is available in the Online 
Appendix. 
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Figure 1: Major and design economic governance provisions in force 
   
The initial design: Why so much pooling? 
Council-centred enforcement 
Figure 2 displays the regime after major reforms in terms of shares of design provisions, while Figure 3 
displays the share of pooling and delegating provisions that are related to an enforcement activity. Only 
pooling occurred by the time the initial framework was completed in 1997. Apart from proposal 
competences, no provisions delegated powers to the Commission or granted some leeway to member 
states. Council constraining provisions and tightening provisions were similarly employed. 
The Maastricht treaty (and the proximate EDP regulation) set some general demands on member states 
on coordination and reporting of economic policies and public finances, and more specific 
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requirements, such as the well-known obligation to avoid excessive government spending, with the 
associated reference values of deficit and debt to GDP. We will not discuss here treaty negotiations, but 
the initial design is not fully aligned with liberal intergovernmentalism. As expected, prerogatives were 
pooled where rules on financing, bailout, multilateral surveillance and the EDP had to be laid down, 
but pooling occurred also with regard to the publicity of recommendations establishing inconsistency 
between national measures and broad economic guidelines, and the determination and sanctioning of 
excessive deficits. Two thirds of pooling provisions concerned enforcement (see Figure 3). The 
absence of delegation betrays a lack of concern about compliance and it is a likely indication of the 
unique salience of the policy, as postfunctionalist scholars emphasize. 
Figure 2: Economic governance by proportion of design provisions in force 
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Figure 3: Proportion of pooling and delegating provisions related to enforcement 
 
Noncompliance, threat of exclusion and contested issues 
Noncompliance as well did not have all the consequences expected by liberal intergovernmentalism. 
Figure 4 illustrates the periods under which governments have not been compliant with key provisions 
of the regime (we employ a looser benchmark for debt). Consider only the deficit criteria for the time 
being. By 1996, the Council established that every member state had an excessive deficit, except for 
Ireland and Luxembourg. As the deadline for selecting countries that would have adopted the euro was 
approaching and as it became clear that those with a history of fiscal profligacy, like Italy, may have 
been in the first wave, the German government pressed for a strengthening of the regime, under an 
implicit but credible threat of a smaller Eurozone. 
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Yet, delegation was barely an issue. Negotiations centred on the circumstances under which a deficit 
would not be considered excessive, the automaticity of the procedure and the size of the sanctions. The 
first two issues were about the Council’s room of manoeuvre. The German and Dutch governments 
argued for specific thresholds (Agence Europe 1996: 5) and proposed that automatic exemptions 
should apply only to countries experiencing an annual decline in real GDP of at least 2 percent. The 
Belgian, French and Italian governments preferred keeping the Council free to determine country-
specific exceptional circumstances. The 2 percent threshold was eventually included in article 2.2 of 
the SGP corrective arm, but the third comma stipulated that circumstances could be exceptional also for 
a contraction of less than 2 percent, ‘in light of further evidence’. It was a modest amendment. A 
resolution of the Amsterdam European Council summit of June 1997 further narrowed the Council’s 
faculty to exempt noncompliant countries to cases when the reduction was more than 0.75 percent, so 
called ‘box model’. In sum, the most recalcitrant countries accepted to limit Council’s powers only in 
case of mild recessions and this exception was not even included as a legal provision in the SGP. 
In the second contested issue, the German, Danish, Finnish and Swedish governments proposed to 
insert the words ‘the expectation is that the Council will respect the Commission’s decision’. They 
settled for the inclusion of the words ‘as a rule’ in articles 2 and 11. The last contested topic concerned 
the deposit to be made in case of an excessive deficit. The German government argued for a fixed 
component of 0.25 percent of GDP, but it had to settle with the Commission proposal of 0.2 percent, 
which was supported by the majority of governments. 
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Figure 4: Periods of noncompliance with fiscal provisions 
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Note: Excessive deficit, debt greater than GDP, medium-term objective (mto), expenditure benchmark 
(eb), infringements. Darker bars for years with euro. Vertical lines separate reforms. See Online 
Appendix for more details.  
 
Explaining pooling in the SGP: Veto power and policy uncertainty 
Some demands for tightening were met in the SGP. The preventive measure required states to submit 
annual stability or convergence programmes, with an MTO of close to balance or in surplus. The need 
to assembly only a qualified majority in the Council for its adoption may have facilitated this outcome, 
as neofunctionalism suggests. On the other hand, the corrective regulation primarily circumscribed 
Council prerogatives by establishing conditions for an excessive deficit, deadlines and sanctions (see 
Figures 1 and 2). The bargaining dynamics emphasized by liberal intergovernmentalism is in clear 
display here. While the most recalcitrant governments caved in and agreed to revise the regime in order 
to defuse the threat of exclusion, these governments were empowered by the unanimity requirement. 
Keen to preserve Council’s prerogatives, they made modest concessions to the most reformist 
colleagues, in order to signal commitment to fiscal stability, but avoided delegation. However, the SGP 
remained overall a modest reform in terms of policy design, with pooling still dominant in enforcement 
despite noncompliance. Two thirds of pooled prerogatives were related to this activity (see Figure 3).  
From a postfunctionalist perspective, limited tightening and no delegation is the result of the unique 
salience of the policy. But one ingredient is missing. There is hardly evidence that the conflict 
surrounding these negotiations turned into mass public debates, despite raising politicisation in the 
1990s (Hutter et al. 2016). In our view, other important factors militating against delegation were the 
uncertainties surrounding these rules. This regime’s primary objectives are to prevent moral hazard in 
public spending in a monetary union and to limit negative externalities associated with the possible 
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combination of expansionary fiscal policies and a contractionary monetary policy (the former resulting 
from governments’ attempts to use fiscal policy to boost output and employment in the short-term at 
the expense of inflation, the latter from an inflation-averse common central bank). These rules should 
ensure sustainable public debts, allowing enough flexibility for countercyclical policies (e.g. Claeys et 
al. 2016). 
At the time of drafting the SGP however, these externalities were purely hypothetical consequences of 
establishing a monetary union. Some scholars downplayed their magnitude and questioned their 
direction. Buiter et al. (1993) explicitly argued for the reference values to be disregarded. No bailout 
rules were deemed sufficient to deal with the risk of default and with financial contagion: governments 
would avoid excessive spending anyway, if the central bank is credibly inflation-averse and if financial 
markets demand higher risk premia from profligate governments (see also Buiter 2006; Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz 1998). However, the commitments to no bailout and to stable prices were obviously 
untested, while the prospects of countries with histories of fiscal improvidence joining the monetary 
union were becoming concrete. 
Another concern was that these reference values could induce pernicious pro-cyclical policies since 
governments may have to cut spending or raise taxes during a recession (thus, undermining the 
credibility of financial sanctions), while they could increase spending or cut taxes during a recovery. 
Efficacy aside, several different combinations of debt and deficit values are fiscally sustainable, so any 
given set of parameters is necessarily arbitrary and it risks being excessively constraining (Pasinetti 
1998). 
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The 2005 reform: Why loosening despite noncompliance? 
Loosening and modest delegation 
This reform introduces two small but significant changes. First, four provisions (6 percent of design 
provisions in force) grant member states greater flexibility. Most were inserted in the preventive SGP 
regulation. Article 2a replaces a common MTO (recall, the structural budget objective) with a revisable 
country-specific one, which may now diverge by no more than 1 percent of GDP from a balance or 
surplus position. On the other hand, the EDP regulation adds new obligations about the provision of 
statistical data, professionalism of statistics officials and assistance to Commission’s inspections. 
Hence, about a third of the policy design still consists of tightening provisions. 
The second significant change concerns six provisions in the EDP regulation conferring policy 
prerogatives upon the Commission (amounting to 6 percent of design provisions). The Commission 
sets statistical formats, adopts data collection guidelines, and determines the implementation of 
accounting rules. Importantly, the supranational executive can object to the quality of reported data and 
amend them. 
The role of the Council is unaltered, on balance. On the one hand, the definition of severe economic 
downturn – a key contested issue in 1997 – is relaxed. The box model is dropped, and now even a 
protracted period of very low growth can be a mitigating factor to avoid the procedure. Decisions can 
be revised in case of unexpected adverse events and the assessment time frame is extended.1 On the 
other hand, the preventive regulation clarifies the criteria for examining structural budgets in light of 
the MTOs; while the corrective regulation specifies that the Council must request minimum annual 
                                                 
1 Except perhaps for pension reforms, it is unclear whether the criteria for evaluating budgets listed in 
the corrective regulation allows for greater discretion. 
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improvements of the structural budget of 0.5 percent of GDP from noncomplying states. Deadline 
extensions cannot exceed one year. 
Consequences of EDP regulation noncompliance: Tightening and delegation 
As Figure 4 illustrates, after a respite of a few years, noncompliance reappeared. In 2004, Eurostat 
revised upwards the Greek deficit by between 2 and 3 percentage points of GDP for the years 2000 to 
2003 and the 2003 debt-GDP ratio by more than 7 percentage points. In December 2004, the 
Commission initiated an infringement procedure against Greece for failing to comply with the EDP 
regulation. The new design corroborates liberal intergovernmentalism. National obligations were 
tightened and Commission’s competences expanded. Half of delegating provisions relates to 
enforcement, the remaining half to implementation (see Figure 3). Qualified majority may have helped 
addressing these demands, as neofunctionalism suggests. The most contentious issue indeed concerned 
Commission’s prerogatives. The four largest countries opposed regular methodological inspections of 
national data as well as a first in-depth monitoring visit, proposed by Luxembourgish Presidency. 
Article 8d narrowly defines the objectives of these visits and specifies that they should take place only 
in case of serious problems. 
This reform runs counter postfunctionalist expectations but some of their scope conditions were absent. 
Conflict remained circumscribed to the elite level in these negotiations. Recent works actually indicate 
that debates on European issues in the early 2000s were less politicised than in the previous decade 
(Hutter et al. 2016: 281).  
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Consequences of SGP noncompliance: Loosening, reversion point and policy uncertainty  
Governments also failed to comply with the fiscal rules. Between 2000 and 2004, four Eurozone 
countries, including France and Germany, had an excessive deficit, while high indebtedness persisted 
in some other countries. Yet, in shifting the focus from correction to prevention, the SGP loosened 
some national obligations and relaxed some Council constraints, while the Commission obtained no 
new substantive powers. Moreover, the corrective regulation pools two additional enforcement-related 
prerogatives concerning the revision of decisions. 
This outcome is not easy to reconcile with postfunctionalism, given limited politicisation, nor with 
liberal intergovernmentalism, given noncompliance. A qualified majority might have been easier to 
assemble in the preventive arm. Indeed, the 1 percent floor to the divergence from the MTO was 
inserted by the Council. But this reform of the corrective arm, which requires unanimity, is unexpected 
at first sight. By far the most controversial issue concerned the numerousness and specificity of 
mitigating factors for establishing an excessive deficit. The conflict replicated the 1997 divide, but with 
the German position reversed. This time chancellor Gerhard Schröder argued for more leniency and 
proposed a long list of factors that was viewed favourably by France and Italy. These governments 
either were noncompliant or risked being so. In March 2005, Luxembourgish Jean-Claude Juncker, 
presiding the Council, proposed a shorter list, which was criticized by both governments that wanted to 
add specific spending categories (the three above plus the United Kingdom) and those that considered 
it too long and insisted on the centrality of the reference values. The more recalcitrant Eurozone 
countries had a history of better compliance (except for the Netherlands). This list was eventually 
abandoned in favour of a somewhat fuzzy but still long enumeration of factors in article 2.3 and an 
invitation to a “balanced overall assessment”. As an “overarching principle”, mitigation would be 
considered only if the deficit remained close to the reference value and its excess was temporary. 
20 
 
Nevertheless, considering also the laxer criteria of protracted low growth as mitigating factor, these 
changes undeniably expanded Council discretion and diluted control over national authorities. 
Why did recalcitrant and mostly compliant governments not veto these developments and push for 
delegation? Liberal intergovernmentalism proves its usefulness by directing our attention to the no 
agreement outcome. The reversion point of these negotiations was the suspension of the EDP – clearly 
an unpleasant outcome for these fiscally responsible governments. In November 2003 France and 
Germany managed to assemble a minority to block decisions establishing the insufficiency of their 
measures and demanding further action under the threat of sanctions (Heipertz and Verdun 2010: 142–
154). The Council also declared that the procedure was held in abeyance. Although this latter decision 
was successfully challenged by the Commission before the European Court of Justice in July 2004, the 
Court upheld the Council’s right to block decisions. It was therefore clear that there was a minority 
blocking any new Commission’s recommendation – a de facto abeyance. The least reformist countries 
had therefore to accept a looser regime and more emphasis on preventive surveillance in exchange of 
resuming the procedure and stricter constraints once an excess was determined. The unpalatable 
consequences of no agreement defused the threats of veto and engendered willingness to compromise. 
Given several governments pushing for loosening and more Council leeway, we should hardly expect 
delegation. This is in line with postfunctionalism, were it not for the limited politicisation. But in our 
view, the prevailing reluctance to delegate may have also been motivated by the renewed emphasis on 
the structural budget: an unobservable quantity subject to significant estimation errors,2 which depends 
on estimates of the output gap – also an unobservable quantity that in turn depends on estimates of, for 
instance, total factor productivity and (non-accelerating wage) rate of unemployment. Forecasting 
                                                 
2 Yearly revisions of the structural balance are larger than 0.5 percent of GDP, i.e. the required baseline 
annual adjustment (Claeys et al. 2016: 6). 
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errors of output growth and inflation add further uncertainty. In sum, governments agreed to a 
preventive surveillance based on an imprecise indicator over which they had limited control. No 
wonder they were not inclined to delegate. 
The euro crisis: Policy failure and enforcement reform 
Delegation and tightening 
This overhaul of economic governance was adopted in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis. In Figures 
1 and 2, we distinguish between the six-pack on the one side, and the two-pack and fiscal compact on 
the other. These measures are part of the same reform, even though they span over a three-year period. 
As Figure 1 shows, the number of major provisions more than tripled and the main beneficiary is 
undoubtedly the Commission. Figure 2 reports that the share of delegating provisions has moved from 
6 to 14 percent and the share of pooling provisions are correspondingly decreased from 18 to 14 
percent. Provisions giving national authorities some leeway, mostly exemptions, have marginally 
increased from 5 to 7 percent. With more powers, provisions constraining the Commission have 
correspondently increased from 14 to 21 percent, while the Council share has decreased from 25 to 15 
percent. The proportion of tightening provisions has barely altered. Almost half of new ones are 
included in the two-pack, less than a quarter in the budgetary frameworks directive and a tenth in the 
fiscal compact.  
The reform establishes more precise assessment benchmarks: an annual real expenditure growth to 
assess progress toward the MTO in the preventive regulation and an annual rate of improvement of the 
debt-GDP ratio for countries exceeding the reference value in the corrective regulation. The fiscal 
compact narrows to 0.5 percent of GDP the acceptable MTO divergence for countries exceeding the 
debt reference value. 
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The strengthening of Commission’s power is both procedural and substantive and occurs primarily in 
four measures (adopted with the ordinary legislative procedure): the SGP preventive regulation, the 
new SGP enforcement regulation and the two-pack regulations (the Online Appendix summarizes 
noteworthy delegating provisions). Notably, 77 percent of them are enforcement related (see Figure 3). 
On the other side, accountability to the Parliament has been strengthened through its involvement in the 
economic dialogue and its oversight of Commission delegated acts. 
Although the shift in policy design from pooling to delegation is clear, the triplicated pooling 
provisions are still predominantly enforcement related (85 percent, see Figure 3). In the SGP 
enforcement regulation, sanctioning remains centred on the Council. In the two-pack surveillance 
regulation, this institution approves adjustment programmes, establishes noncompliance and sets 
conditionality requirements. A third of the new pooling provisions comes from the MIB, and the 
enforcement of this measure relies more on the Council than on the Commission, compared to the SGP. 
Explaining the overhaul: Noncompliance, exit cost and issue linkage 
As Figure 4 illustrates, the patterns of noncompliance leading up to this reform amounted to a policy 
failure. The significant revisions of the Greek government deficit in late 2009 raised serious concerns 
about data quality and led to opening an infringement procedure. This was the proximate cause of the 
sovereign debt crisis but the preceding financial crisis had already put public finances under serious 
strain. The structural balance of every single Eurozone country, except Slovakia, intermittently 
diverged from the MTOs. Public indebtedness worsened. Then, in 2010, every country, except for 
Luxemburg, ran an excessive deficit, while Greece, Ireland and Portugal had to secure bailout loans. 
Negotiations were also highly mass politicised (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018; Kriesi and Grande 
2016), making this reform a sort of critical test of these theories. 
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Overall, liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are more convincingly corroborated. As 
Schimmelfennig (2015: 184) aptly puts it, the ensuing bargaining dynamics took the form of a game of 
chicken between fiscally sound governments and those under pressure for financing their outlays. The 
significant risks of dissolution of the Eurozone - an exit option of vast consequences - compelled them 
to solve the crisis but each preferred to shift the burden of adaptation on the counterpart. The former 
sought commitment to fiscal discipline, the latter to bailout.3 For instance, this linkage explains why the 
Italian and Greek governments, despite their power to veto the corrective regulation, accepted the new 
benchmark of a debt-GDP ratio improvement for highly indebted countries (but successfully opposed 
demands to narrow the mitigating factors for determining an excessive deficit). 
In the other measures, the shift in policy design toward tightening and delegation (especially for 
noncompliance and sanctioning decisions, with the consequence of narrowing Council influence) has 
also been facilitated by Council qualified majority voting (and parliamentary involvement). For 
instance, in the preventive regulation, the discussion centred on a) a different MTO adjustment path for 
highly indebted countries and b) the consequences of budgetary deviations. The Italian government 
argued against a differentiated assessment and, together with the Greek government, against sanctions 
for deviations. The new article 5.1 instead demands the Council and the Commission to examine 
whether annual budgetary improvements reach at least 0.5 percent of GDP for these countries (the 
Finnish, Dutch and Luxembourgish governments pressed for a more explicit requirement, which was 
eventually inserted in the fiscal compact). Moreover, article 5.1 not only operationalizes the adjustment 
                                                 
3 For positions on capacity building measures, see Lehner and Wasserfallen (2019). As corroborating 
evidence, we find Germany, Finland and the Netherlands opposing article 13.4 of the SGP enforcement 
regulation that demands the Commission to draft a report on Eurobonds. 
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path through an expenditure benchmark, but the new article 6.2 also demands the Council to act within 
a month of a warning; and sanctions are envisioned. 
Politicisation did not engender a convergence of positions over policy design. Benelux governments 
even proposed to extend the enhanced proposal prerogatives of the Commission to more SGP and MIB 
provisions. The Parliament was instead instrumental for including sanctions for manipulating statistics 
in the SGP enforcement regulation and for keeping Council qualified majority voting for approving 
adjustment programmes in the two-pack, over the opposition of several ministers.  
In sum, noncompliance and the pressure of securing commitment to both fiscal soundness and bailout 
produced a reform in the direction predicted by liberal intergovernmentalism. Additionally, as 
neofunctionalism expects, prohibitive exit costs limited available options and lower procedural hurdles 
facilitated tightening and delegation. These changes are not unexpected (cf. Bauer and Becker 2014; 
Dehousse 2016). Delegation may have been also perceived as less risky since the Commission has been 
building up non-trivial policy capabilities over time (Savage and Verdun 2016). And, although 
uncertainties persist, the new expenditure rule is a step toward more certain and controllable 
performance indicators (Claeys et al. 2016). 
Conclusion 
We cannot rely on a single theory to understand economic governance design. Contrary to liberal 
intergovernmentalist expectations, enforcement has been heavily Council-centred until 2011, despite 
significant noncompliance, as it is in the recent two-pack surveillance regulation and MIB. As 
postfunctionalist theories suggest (pooling aside), the salience of this policy has quite likely underlain 
the reluctance to tighten and delegate. But these approaches fall short in highly politicised contexts, 
exactly where they should do most of the explaining. In our view, the unavoidable arbitrariness and 
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uncertainties of these rules must also have cautioned against relying on a supranational executive with 
limited resources. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism remain valuable for explaining the overall 
direction of these reforms toward tightening, restricting Council authority and delegation - precipitated 
by noncompliance and characterized by commitment problems, threats of exclusion and veto, issue 
linkages, path dependencies and more supranational decision-making. Attention to these bargaining 
dynamics helps illuminating outcomes, even when loosening follows noncompliance, while functional 
logics, such as the need to secure credible commitments, appear unaltered. 
In conclusion, policy-makers do not seem to react to mass politicisation by loosening obligations and 
avoiding pooling and delegation. They do not cave in and ensure that the policy remains or returns 
under national control. The ‘new intergovernmental moment’ saw a move from Council- to 
Commission-centred enforcement, without relying on new institutions. Tightening, pooling and 
delegation occurred despite the highly politicised negotiations of the recent reform. Response-wise, 
these changes indicate that, in the face of rising domestic public pressures, EU-level actors have 
adopted a strategy of assertive depoliticisation, although without shying away from open confrontation 
(Bressanelli et al. forthcoming). Facing the serious consequences of a Eurozone break-up, this is indeed 
the type of reactive politicisation management ministers (and parliamentarians) would be expected to 
undertake, despite their electoral accountability and the domestic salience of this core state policy 
(Schimmelfennig forthcoming). Nor should we ignore the plausible assertion that mass domestic 
politicisation in the latest reform was triggered by noncompliance and elite conflict, which may also 
explain why leaders have decided to assertively pursue (institutional) depoliticisation. 
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